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“Don’t Try This at Home”:
Posner as Political Economist
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz†

On September 8, 1986, the Chicago City Council enacted a comprehensive ordinance regulating the relationship between landlords and tenants, following seven years of heated delibera1

tion. The Chicago Board of Realtors, along with property owners and managers, challenged the
2

ordinance’s constitutionality in federal court the following month.

3

The plaintiffs in Chicago Board of Realtors v City of Chicago objected to more than a
dozen provisions in the ordinance, the most pertinent of which (1) enabled tenants to withhold
rent or make repairs themselves if their landlord ignored demands to make necessary repairs; (2)
authorized tenants to secure substitute housing without penalty if the landlord failed to maintain
“habitable” premises; (3) capped penalties for late rent payments; and (4) required that tenant
4

security deposits be held in separate, in-state, interest-bearing accounts. The plaintiffs argued that
these provisions violated their rights under the federal Constitution’s Due Process, Contracts,
5

dormant Commerce, and Takings Clauses. The district court rejected all these claims, noting that
while some of the ordinance’s provisions seemed in tension with the text of the Constitution, prior
6

precedents foreclosed the possibility of its unconstitutionality. The law withstood rational basis
scrutiny, though the district court went on the record with doubts as to whether the law repre7

sented enlightened public policy. As it came to the Seventh Circuit, therefore, this comprehensive
ordinance had been judged unwise, but not unconstitutional.
†Professor of Law and Walter Mander Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago. The author thanks Jake Gersen, Doug Lichtman,
and Stephanie Stern for comments and Emily McKinney for fine research assistance.
1Chicago Board of Realtors v City of Chicago, 673 F Supp 224, 226 (ND Ill 1986).
2Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc v City of Chicago, 819 F2d 732, 734 (7th Cir 1987).
3673 F Supp 224 (ND Ill 1986).
4Id at 230, 233, 236. The plaintiffs also challenged provisions (1) providing that landlords give tenants two days’ notice before accessing the apartment for non-emergencies; (2) requiring that tenants be given detailed receipts upon making payments to landlords;
(3) imposing joint and several liability on successor landlords for interest and security deposits; (4) requiring landlords to provide to
prospective tenants an itemization of any code violation citations issued by the city in the previous twelve months, pending code
enforcement litigation, and any notice of intent by a utility to terminate service to the building; (5) prohibiting landlords from withholding consent to reasonable subleases; (6) requiring landlords to attach a summary of the ordinance to all new or renewed residential
leases; (7) creating a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory eviction in instances where a landlord cancelled or failed to renew a lease
with a tenant who had exercised his rights under the ordinance; (8) requiring that landlords disclose to tenants the identity of the actual
owners of properties held or managed in trust; and (9) rendering unenforceable lease provisions that would conflict with the ordinance’s framework. Id at 229–30.
5Id at 229–36.
6Id at 238.
7Id at 237 (confiding that “[i]f it were my job to evaluate the wisdom of the Ordinance I would grade it highly questionable if not
substantially inadvisable”).
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The Seventh Circuit granted an expedited appeal schedule but refused to enjoin the ordi8

nance pending appeal. Judge Cudahy wrote a dry majority opinion affirming the trial court.
Cudahy’s opinion largely parroted the district court’s handiwork, relying heavily on Supreme
Court opinions that foreclosed the plaintiffs’ Contracts Clause and substantive due process
claims.

9

Had the matter ended there, Chicago Board of Realtors would have been an unremarkable
and uninteresting case, one of a string of judicial opinions rejecting constitutional attacks on land10

lord-tenant regulations. But the matter did not end there. Judge Posner, writing for himself and
Judge Easterbrook, noted his agreement with Cudahy’s opinion “as far as it goes,” but bemoaned
11

its failure to “go far enough.” In Posner’s view, Cudahy’s straightforward application of Supreme Court precedents to the plaintiffs’ claims “makes the rejection of the appeal seem easier
than it is, by refusing to acknowledge the strong case that can be made for the unreasonableness
12

of the ordinance.” Hence, Posner was “led to write separately, and since this separate opinion
13

commands the support of two members of this panel, it is also a majority opinion.”

In the paragraphs that followed, Posner chastised the city council (for enacting such a misguided and disingenuous law), the Supreme Court (for foreclosing what should have been meritorious claims under the Due Process and Contracts Clauses), and the appellants’ lawyers (for inexplicably waiving their purportedly most promising arguments, having to do with the Takings and
14

dormant Commerce Clauses on appeal). Judge Cudahy was plainly annoyed, dismissively refer15

ring to Posner’s concurring opinion as, “at best, superfluous.” Cudahy was of course right in one
sense; Posner’s opinion consisted entirely of dicta. But Posner’s opinion was far from superfluous
in another important sense. It analyzed in some depth the economics of landlord-tenant regulation
so as to generate a novel, intellectually audacious, and falsifiable hypothesis about the political
factors driving the ordinance’s enactment. Posner’s analysis of these sorts of regulations has been
influential in the academy, and this Essay evaluates the merits of his approach.

8Chicago

Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 734.
at 734–41.
10See 40 ALR3d 821 § 2 (1971) (summarizing the general failure of constitutional challenges to rent withholding statutes).
11Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 741 (Posner concurring).
12Id.
13Id.
14Appellants’ counsel did not deserve Posner’s criticism. Having raised a plethora of grievances below, counsel sensibly became
more selective on appeal, developing the strongest arguments and jettisoning the rest. The appellants thus waived their Takings Clause
argument (a likely loser, as the district court correctly held, for the reasons noted below in note 58) and their dormant Commerce
Clause argument (a stronger argument, but one that would have, at most, invalidated a trifling detail in the ordinance—the requirement
that deposits be held in Illinois banks). Despite this, Posner criticized the plaintiffs for not having “raised on this appeal their most
promising challenges” for “reasons that are obscure.” Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 745 (Posner concurring).
15Id at 737 n 2.
9Id
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I. THE ECONOMICS OF LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATION

The central premise of Posner’s economic argument is that by making the landlord business
less profitable, the Chicago ordinance would induce building owners to convert rental buildings
16

into condominiums, to the detriment of poor renters. This is a testable claim, but the available
evidence is not terribly supportive. The leading study on condominium conversions, which was
published shortly after Posner’s opinion, suggests that demand-side factors (buyers wanting to
purchase homes) were approximately twice as important as supply-side factors (landlords finding
rental buildings insufficiently profitable) in driving condominium conversion rates.

17

Of course, that study still suggests that supply-side factors play a role in condominium conversions. A more satisfying way of testing Posner’s economic thesis would be to study what happened in the many jurisdictions that enacted legislation similar to Chicago’s. The most relevant
empirical study available when Posner penned his opinion suggested that the sorts of interventions employed by Chicago, such as rent withholding for warranty violations, repair-and-deduct
remedies for tenants whose landlords refuse to make repairs, and protections against retaliatory
evictions, have no statistically significant effects on tenant welfare, as determined using a hedonic
18

price model. Posner’s opinion cited this study, by Werner Hirsch, though he did not describe its
19

empirical findings. Hirsch, though a skeptic of these laws, found that only the enactment of draconian receivership laws was demonstrably counterproductive from a tenant welfare perspec20

tive, and Chicago’s ordinance contained no receivership provisions. In subsequent work, Hirsch
recrunched his numbers to show that habitability mandates were associated with statistically significant reductions in the welfare of black indigent tenants but did not affect the welfare of aged
21

indigent tenants. No economists, other than Hirsch and his co-authors, have devoted sustained

16Id

at 741.

17Theodore

M. Crone, Changing Rates of Return on Rental Property and Condominium Conversions, 25 Urban Stud 34, 38–39
(1988).
18Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent Tenants, 63 Rev Econ & Stat 263, 271, 274 (1981). See also
Werner Z. Hirsch and Cheung-Kwok Law, Habitability Laws and the Shrinkage of Substandard Rental Housing Stock, 16 Urban Stud
19, 27 (1979) (concluding that “in no case do repair and deduct laws have a statistically significant effect on the shrinkage of substandard rental housing”).
19Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742 (Posner concurring).
20Hirsch, 63 Rev Econ & Stat at 269 (cited in note 18) (“Receivership laws permit the court to appoint a receiver who takes control
of buildings and corrects hazardous defects after the landlord has failed to act within a reasonable time. Rent is deposited with the
court-appointed receiver until the violation is corrected, and as long as the tenant continues to pay rent into escrow he cannot be
evicted for non-payment.”).
21See Werner Z. Hirsch, Effects of Habitability and Anti-Speedy Eviction Laws on Black and Aged Indigent Tenant Groups: An
Economic Analysis, 3 Intl Rev L & Econ 121 (1983). Assuming its robustness, this finding suggests that the effects of the Chicago
ordinance would be worse than Posner anticipated in an important sense. Landlords might have relied increasingly on tenant screening
after the enactment of the Chicago ordinance, perhaps letting racial animus infect their renting decisions or using criteria that had a
disparate impact on African American renters.
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attention to studying habitability and rent-withholding laws empirically. The available evidence
therefore suggests that Posner was right to be skeptical that the Chicago ordinance would help
poor tenants but perhaps too hasty to conclude that it would harm them.
Why might such legal reforms have minimal effects on the rental housing market? One possibility is that the poor tenants who are likely to be evicted are ignorant of their legal rights, and
22

thus usually do not assert newly authorized causes of action in the courts. This explanation is
23

supported by evidence from several jurisdictions, including Chicago. Six months after the Chicago ordinance at issue in this case became law, tenants were largely still oblivious to their newly
24

acquired rights, despite a substantial publicity effort by the city.

II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LANDLORD-TENANT REGULATION
It is heartening to see a federal judge grappling with the economics of landlord-tenant regulation in a sophisticated way. Indeed, if the debate between Posner and Cudahy in Chicago Board
of Realtors is about whether the real economic consequences of the ordinance shed light on its
constitutionality, the reader should not hesitate to side with Posner. That said, whereas Posner’s
economic critique of the Chicago ordinance is plausible, his political economy story fares worse.
Posner foreshadows his political economy story early in the opinion, asserting that the
“stated purpose of the ordinance is to promote public health, safety, and welfare and the quality of
housing in Chicago. It is unlikely that this is the real purpose, and it is not the likely effect.”

25

Posner’s economic analysis of the ordinance immediately follows, but he returns to explaining the
ordinance’s “real purpose” three paragraphs later:
The ordinance is not in the interest of poor people. As is frequently the case with
legislation ostensibly designed to promote the welfare of the poor, the principal
beneficiaries will be middle-class people. They will be people who buy rather than
rent housing (the conversion of rental to owner housing will reduce the price of the
latter by increasing its supply); people willing to pay a higher rent for better-quality
housing; and (a largely overlapping group) more affluent tenants, who will become
more attractive to landlords because such tenants are less likely to be later with the
rent or to abuse the right of withholding rent . . . . The losers from the ordinance will
be some landlords, some out-of-state banks, the poorest class of tenants, and future
tenants. The landlords are few in number . . . . Out-of-staters can’t vote in Chicago
22Ben H. Logan III and John J. Sabl, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 Stan L Rev 729,
776–77 (1976) (concluding in part that the implied warranty of habitability is “unknown and relatively unimportant to the very people
it was intended to assist”). Relatedly, landlords and tenants might fall back on efficient social norms, regardless of what the law says.
See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 279 (Harvard 1991) (arguing that the norm of “you are
entitled to get what you pay for” governs landlord-tenant relations more than any legal regime).
23For a review of this literature, see Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urban L Ann 3, 144–53 (1979).
24Michele L. Norris, Renters Still in the Dark about Rights, Chi Trib Section 2 at 1 (Apr 27, 1987).
25Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 741 (Posner concurring).
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elections. Poor people in our society don’t vote as often as the affluent. . . . And future tenants are a diffuse and largely unknown class. In contrast, the beneficiaries of
the ordinance are the most influential group in the city’s population. So the politics
of the ordinance are plain enough, and they have nothing to do with either improving the allocation of resources to housing or bringing about a more equal distribu26
tion of income and wealth.
The block quote is lengthy, and the reader will be tempted to skip over it, often a winning strategy
when it comes to block quotes. But this is a rare instance in which the reader ought to resist that
temptation, because in the span of a couple hundred words, Posner has constructed a fascinating,
intricate, novel, and wrongheaded account of urban politics.
Let us begin with Posner’s assessment of the role of interest groups in the ordinance’s enactment. Posner helpfully divides the affected parties into winners (homeowners, renters of lux27

ury apartments, and high-income renters), and losers (landlords, out-of-state banks, poor renters,
28

and future renters). This political fight turns out to be no contest, according to Posner. Homeowners are “the most influential group in the city’s population” and the losers are political pipsqueaks who can’t vote (out-of-state banks), don’t vote (poor renters) or don’t have enough votes
29

(landlords).

Posner’s characterization of the ordinance’s winners and losers is, at the very least, contro30

versial. Take homeowners. Posner predicts that the Chicago ordinance will lower real estate
values, especially for condominiums, but fails to explain why homeowners would want home
prices to drop. Home equity is the nest egg of many Americans, to be used for retirement or as
31

collateral for education, businesses, startups, and other important investments. A decline in real
estate prices is hardly a cause for celebration among existing homeowners, just as a decline in
stock prices rarely perks up the moods of equity investors. Much of the pertinent economics literature is premised on the idea that homeowners want to maximize the value of their homes, and
32

that this motivation best explains local governments’ land use policies. To be sure, some people
benefit from declines in real estate prices. Among them, two groups stand out: renters who can
afford to buy homes, and homeowners in other locales who are thinking about moving to Chi26Id

at 742 (citation omitted).
in the mid-1980s , the moniker “luxury apartments” meant something more than “running water provided.” Today,
practically every landlord in Chicago claims to be renting “luxury apartments.”
28By implication, in-state banks should be counted as winners, though Posner omits them from his tally.
29Chicago Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742 (Posner concurring).
30Homeowners are numerous and relatively affluent. But their political potency might be mitigated somewhat by their dispersed
nature. Nevertheless, Posner’s description of their political clout seems apt. See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How
Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 4 (Harvard 2001) (“[H]omeowners . . .
are the most numerous and politically influential group within most localities.”).
31Id.
32See, for example, id.
27Presumably,
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cago. The former are not a particularly large or powerful interest group. The latter are “a diffuse
33

and largely unknown class” of nonvoters with no clout in Chicago politics.

What about the banks? Posner is surely right that in-state banks would gain some business
under the ordinance, in light of the new requirement that landlords deposit tenants’ security deposits in the jurisdiction. But servicing interest-bearing accounts is small potatoes in the banking
industry. The mortgage lending business is banks’ bread and butter, and the market for mortgage
loans has long been national in scope. Condominium conversions should engender substantial
mortgage lending activity, as renters approach banks seeking loans. So if Posner’s economic
analysis is right, then out-of-state banks will lose a handful of interest bearing accounts, but will
gain substantially from increased mortgage lending activities. That looks like a win, not a loss, for
the banks, and it might explain their lack of involvement in this litigation.
One politically powerful interest group is mysteriously omitted from the political economy
account: real estate agents. This oversight is odd, given the case caption in Chicago Board of
Realtors. We can certainly imagine that realtors would be upset by declining real estate prices,
since agents have long received a 6 percent commission on the purchase price of residential real
estate. On the other hand, if Posner’s predictions about rental buildings going condo are correct,
these declines in real estate prices could be offset by an increase in the number of sales. But in
order to keep their earnings at the same level, real estate agents would have to work harder. Selling ten homes requires more work than selling nine homes, but selling a $1,000,000 home is
probably no more difficult than selling a $900,000 home. So the real estate agents’ involvement in
this litigation may have a straightforward explanation.
Tallying the winners and losers from this ordinance, then, turns out to be more difficult than
Posner’s opinion suggests. But Posner goes further astray in converting his account of the winners and losers into an explanation of why the Chicago ordinance was enacted. Posner sees middle class homeowners as the primary beneficiaries of the legislation and thinks this is no accident.
He describes aiding this politically powerful interest group as the ordinance’s “real purpose.”

34

Hence, Posner says, “the politics of the ordinance are plain enough,” and he follows this statement with a “cf” citation to Stephen DeCanio’s essay, Rent Control Voting Patterns, Popular
Views, and Group Interests.

33Chicago

35

Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 742 (Posner concurring).
at 741.
35Id at 742.
34Id
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Alas, DeCanio’s essay undercuts Posner’s claims. DeCanio studied Santa Barbara voters’
36

support for a local rent control ordinance and statewide rent control initiative. DeCanio found
that renter status made voters significantly more likely to support the local rent control ordinance
37

and that party affiliation also had a significant effect. After controlling for renter status and partisan affiliation, poverty status and minority ethnic group membership did not significantly affect
38

support for rent control. Although DeCanio plausibly posited that rent control could harm poor
people and minorities (by prompting greater discrimination by landlords, who would regard the
poor and minorities as less upwardly mobile, and hence long-term tenants), he suggested that
voters in general would “see no farther than immediate redistributive effects” and hence be un39

aware of this potential dynamic. On the next page, DeCanio elaborates:
Despite the lure of redistributionism, the economists’ arguments against rent control
on allocational grounds are not easily dismissed intellectually. . . . [O]nce a measure
has been certified for the ballot, there is no a priori reason to expect that citizens
will acquire and apply the information necessary to make a fully informed evaluation of the arguments. The costs of acquiring the information can be very large indeed. Although rent control is relatively simple in its economic analytics compared
to some of the other economic issues facing the public, the analysis is not selfevident. The incontrovertible evidence of economic rationality exhibited at the level
of individual economic activity does not imply that individuals will be able to gen40
erate, recognize, or support globally optimal economic policies.
Rent control, DeCanio concludes, presents a fairly easy economic question, but voters have a
difficult time understanding how the second-order distortions that rent control creates may adversely affect them. Accordingly, boundedly rational voters may well vote against their long-term
economic interests. If the economics of rent control are too complicated for the median voter to
understand, then the same voter would have been at sea in trying to make sense of the economics
of the Chicago ordinance’s rent-withholding, warranty of habitability, and other provisions.
Of course, where complex issues arise, the median voter is not necessarily left to her own
devices. Political and mass media elites might set to work understanding an ordinance and then
explain the ordinance’s effects in language that ordinary voters can understand. To that end, it is
worth reviewing the contemporary media coverage of the Chicago ordinance to see if the welfare
and distributional effects that Posner posits were discussed in the press.
The Chicago ordinance was the subject of extensive coverage from the local newspapers, but
36Stephen J. DeCanio, Rent Control Voting Patterns, Popular Views, and Group Interests, in M. Bruce Johnson, ed, Resolving the
Housing Crisis: Government Policy, Decontrol and the Public Interest 307–10 (Ballinger 1982).
37Id at 312.
38Id.
39Id at 313.
40Id at 314.
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none of that coverage suggested that middle class owners of single-family residences played any
part in securing its enactment. Rather, the newspapers uniformly identified tenants’ rights groups
41

as the interests agitating for the legislation. Indeed, according to the Chicago Tribune, it seemed
plain that tenants would be the primary beneficiaries of the legislation and landlords would suffer
42

its consequences. Although the news coverage occasionally made passing reference to the possibility that landlords would respond to the ordinance by raising rents or scrutinizing incoming
43

tenants more closely, these claims were often juxtaposed with anecdotal evidence suggesting
that this had not happened in the nearby suburb of Evanston, which had previously enacted simi44

lar legislation.

In short, Judge Posner’s account of Chicago’s political economy seems unsupported by contemporary media coverage. It is not difficult to imagine Posner’s political economy story resonating in the dining room of the University of Chicago’s Quadrangle Club, but it is hard to believe
that voters in the city’s other precincts could have fathomed the Posnerian spin on the legislation.
For Posner’s political thesis to have been right, there must have been a conspiracy of silence
among single family homeowners, all of whom tacitly agreed to support the ordinance as an effective means of lowering [!] real estate values, while pushing forward tenant dupes to lend a
proletarian veneer to the legislative effort. Nudge nudge, wink wink. Say no more.
In Chicago Board of Realtors, Judge Posner appears to have made the mistake of projecting
his own dim view of the ordinance onto the minds of the median Chicago voter or alderman. Almost twenty years later, Posner sometimes continues to think about economic regulation through
the same lens. For example, one of his 2006 posts on the Becker-Posner blog argues that (1) middle class teenagers and very poor workers are harmed by minimum wage increases (a plausible
claim); (2) these teenagers and very poor workers understand the ways they are harmed by said
increases (an implausible claim); and (3) minimum wage increases are enacted because the very
poor and teenagers do not vote in large numbers (implausible, given the implausibility of claim
45

(2)). The political science literature has long noted that teenagers and the very poor typically

41See, for example, Harry Golden, Jr., Renters Get a Rights Law, Chi Sun-Times 1 (Sept 9, 1986); Mark Hart, Cheering Crowd
Greets Mayor, Tenants Rights, Uptown News A1 (Aug 5, 1986); Juanita Bratcher, Activists Praise Tenants Rights Ordinance, Chi
Defender 4 (Apr 23, 1984).
42Ann Marie Lipinski, Tenants Get to Wield New Tool: Repair and Deduct, Chi Trib Section 2 at 1 (Oct 12, 1986).
43See, for example, id (quoting a real estate management company president’s fear that rents would go up in response to the ordinance); Bill Granger, For Chicago Renters: A Taxing Situation that Hits You Where You Live, Chi Trib Sunday Magazine 8 (Nov 2,
1986) (referring to real estate agents and landlords who said that the ordinance would result in higher security deposits).
44See Lipinski, Tenants Get to Wield New Tool Section 1 at 1 (cited in note 42); David D. Orr, Letter to the Editor, Tenants, Rents,
Chi Trib Section 1 at 10 (Nov 26, 1986) (arguing that a similar ordinance in Evanston had not had the dire consequences predicted in
Granger’s article).
45Richard A. Posner, Should Congress Raise the Federal Minimum Wage? (Nov 26, 2006) online at http://www.becker-posnerblog.com/archives/2006/11/should_congress.html (visited Apr 23, 2007) (“So why are Democrats pushing to increase the minimum
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lack an understanding of the economist’s critique of minimum wage laws, and therefore they may
46

not vote in accordance with their purported long-term economic interests. Public opinion polls
and newspaper stories indicate that teens and the poorest voters are typically enthusiastic about
minimum wage increases—they believe such mandates will increase their pay but do not contem47

plate the possibility that their jobs will be eliminated. So while interest group theories might
48

explain the enactment of minimum wage increases, it is not the case that the interest groups representing teens and the very poor lose these political fights. If anything, they appear to be on what
Posner would say is the wrong, but winning, side of those fights.

49

III. AFTERMATH
Less able and more modest judges would have refrained from telling any sort of political
economy story in a case like Chicago Board of Realtors, let alone one as intricate as Posner’s.
Judge Cudahy’s boring opinion disposed of all the legal issues necessary for the courts to resolve
the case. Constitutional objections to similar rent withholding ordinances were raised in a good
number of state courts prior to Chicago Board of Realtors, and none of them seem to have suc50

ceeded. The separate opinion in the case is a gambit that non-Posnerian judges would not, and
should not, try at home. But should a Posnerian judge try it? Or, more aptly, should the Posnerian
judge?
Judge Posner seemed to have strong views about the foolishness of landlord-tenant reforms
wage . . . ? [G]enuinely poor people vote little. The number of nonpoor who would be benefited by an increase in the minimum wage,
when combined with the number of nonpoor workers whose incomes will rise as a result of reducing competition from minimumwage workers, probably exceeds the number of nonpoor who will be laid off as a result of an increase in the minimum wage. Teenagers, moreover, will be among the groups hardest hit, and most of them do not vote.”).
46William R. Keech, More on the Vote Winning and Vote Losing Qualities of Minimum Wage Laws, 29 Pub Choice 133, 134–136
(1977). Interestingly, however, even though teenagers often do not appreciate their economic interests, their legislators seem to. Legislators from districts with higher numbers of teenage workers are more likely to oppose legislation increasing the minimum wage. See
also Jonathan I. Silberman and Garey C. Durden, Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J Pol Econ 317 (1976) (presenting an economic analysis of legislative voting patterns on the 1973 amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
47See, for example, Bill Bush, Young Voters Favor Issue 2, Student Survey Says, Columbus Dispatch 3C (Oct 19, 2006); Jennifer
Freeze, Teens and the Election: Minimum Wage Most Important Issue to Many Local Youths, SE Missourian (Oct 31, 2006), online at
http://www.semissourian.com/story/print/1175362.html (visited Apr 23, 2007); Exit polls for Missouri Proposition B, online at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/
MO/I/02/epolls.0.html (visited Apr 23, 2007) (showing that in the 2006 election, the poorest voters favored an increase in minimum
wage by the highest margins); Exit polls for Ohio Issue 2, online at
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/states/OH/I/03/epolls.0.html (visited Apr 23, 2007) (showing that in the 2006
election, the poorest voters and the youngest voters backed a minimum wage increase by the highest margins).
48See Russell S. Sobel, Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of the Minimum Wage, 107 J Pol Econ 761, 779–82 (1999)
(focusing on organized labor unions and business interests, and concluding that the minimum wage level can “be explained by the
relative strength of interest groups”); Frank G. Steindl, The Appeal of Minimum Wage Laws and the Invisible Hand in Government, 14
Pub Choice 133, 133–34 (1973) (providing an economic analysis of why those who stand to lose from the minimum wage support it).
49On the broader phenomenon, see generally Tyler Cowen, Self-Deception as the Root of Political Failure, 124 Pub Choice 437
(2005) (advancing a theory that political failure results because “[i]ndividuals discard free information when that information damages
their self-image and thus lowers their utility”).
5040 ALR3d 821 § 2 (cited in note 10).
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along the lines of Chicago’s efforts, so we can assume that he enjoyed airing those views and
attempting to influence the public debate over them. In that sense, Chicago Board of Realtors was
a great success. Posner’s opinion (unlike Cudahy’s) found its way into the dominant Property
51

casebook used in American law schools, where it is the primary case on affordable housing
52

53

law, and its substance has not been heavily criticized. The discussion of rent-withholding statutes and housing code enforcement in Posner’s treatise on the economic of analysis of law similarly cites to only one case: Chicago Board of Realtors.

54

At the same time, there was a cost to voicing his displeasure with the ordinance. Future jurists confronting similar challenges saw Posner’s denunciation of the ordinance, but also his bottom line, and concluded that if Posner could not strike down the ordinance in light of his deep
55

skepticism as to its wisdom, neither could they. Whatever its impact on 1L Property students, its
impact on contemporary jurists seems to have been negligible. The one important published case
that embraced parts of Posner’s analysis, Action Apartment Association v Santa Monica Rent
56

Control Board, employed Posner’s characterization of the Chicago ordinance as a naked wealth
transfer to hold that a law requiring landlords to pay tenants 3 percent interest on security deposits
57

kept for longer than a year was an unconstitutional taking. Action Apartment, however, applied
58

the Supreme Court’s Penn Central takings test unpersuasively. Hence subsequent California
courts essentially have limited Action Apartment to its facts.

59

This is a tradeoff that Posner undoubtedly understood. His criticisms of the wisdom of enacting ordinances like Chicago’s could resonate with legal scholars and the generations of law students that they would teach. In the long term, Posner’s opinion could help lay the groundwork for
the eventual repeal or invalidation of such laws. But in the short run, Posner’s unwillingness to

51Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW U L Rev 907, 908 n 6 (2004) (noting the ubiquity of the property casebook by Jesse Dukeminier and his coauthors).
52Jesse Dukeminier et al, Property 444 (Aspen 6th ed 2006)
53See id at 552–55.
54Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 16.6 at 518 n 9. (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
55See, for example, Oak Park Trust & Sav Bank v Village of Mount Prospect, 181 Ill App 3d 10, 536 NE2d 763, 771 (1989).
5694 Cal App 4th 587, 114 Cal Rptr 2d 412 (2001).
57Id at 426 (citing Chicago Board of Realtors to support Takings Clause analysis). Recall that Judge Posner had chastised the
plaintiffs for not pressing a takings argument on appeal. See note 14.
58Under Penn Central, the extent of the diminution in the landlord’s property interest is the most important factor in determining
whether a taking has occurred. Regulations that reduce the value of the regulated land by 50 percent or more are often deemed not to
be takings under Penn Central. See Tahoe-Sierra Preserv Council v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 319 n 15 (2002)
(noting that diminution of property value cannot alone establish a taking). The idea that a deprivation of the difference between the
market interest rate and 3 percent is a taking under Penn Central strains credulity, for such a regulation would have a minimal effect
on the value of the landlord’s real property. Id at 327 (noting that a significant deprivation of property is required to make a taking).
See also Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519, 539 (1992) (holding that a rent control ordinance is not a taking).
59See, for example, Small Property Owners of San Francisco v City and County of San Francisco, 141 Cal App 4th 1388, 47 Cal
Rptr 3d 121, 133–36 (2006) (distinguishing Action Apartment on numerous grounds to hold that a San Francisco ordinance requiring
a 5 percent interest on tenants’ security deposits did not effect a taking).
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strike down the ordinance in light of his many qualms seemed to put the final nail in the coffin of
a rather broad but universally unsuccessful effort to invalidate these sorts of ordinances on constitutional grounds. As Posner wistfully remarks toward the end of his opinion, the “plaintiffs have
60

brought their case in the wrong era.” Seen in this light, we might treat Chicago Board of Realtors as a data point that provides hints about Posner’s discount rate. His willingness to tolerate a
short-term and medium-term policy that he found deeply misguided, in the hopes that his words
might help engender a long-term reversal driven by legal elites, suggests that Posner cares a great
deal about the way in which he will be remembered once he puts down his pen.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lior Strahilevitz
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lior@uchicago.edu

60Chicago

Board of Realtors, 819 F2d at 745 (Posner concurring).

12

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–299 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal vs. Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols (August 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006)
Anup Malani and Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (September 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
M. Todd Henderson, Payiing CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low
(September 2006)
Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance (September
2006)
Randal C. Picker, Who Should Regulate Entry into IPTV and Municipal Wireless? (September 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September 2006)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006)
Randal C. Picker, Review of Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (October 2006)
Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?
(November 2006)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law (November 2006)
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Wealth without Markets? (November 2006)
Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (December 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (December 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas) (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Completely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007)
Albert H. Choi and Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine (January 2007)
Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007)
Cass. R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation,
Balancing and Stigmatic Harms (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007)
David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the
Corporate Tax (January 2007)
Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comments on “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design” (January 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal (January
2007)
Randal C. Picker, Pulling a Rabbi Out of His Hat: The Bankruptcy Magic of Dick Posner (February 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic (Libertarian) Authoritarian (February 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. Part II: State
Level Analysis (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March 2007)
M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps (March 2007)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive (April 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (May 2007)
Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities (June 2007)
David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation? (June 2007)
David S. Abrams and Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia
Bail Experiment (June 2007)

2007]

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

351.

“Don’t Try This at Home”: Posner as Political Economist

13

Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions (June 2007)
Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posners, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis (July 2007)
Daniel Kahneman and Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law (July 2007)
Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions (July 2007)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Consitutional Showdowns (July 2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination (July 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, Governmentality, and Race (July
2007)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Don’t Try This at Home”: Posner as Political Economist (July 2007)

